I. INTRODUCTION In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that an indictment could not be dismissed unless the error committed during the grand jury proceedings substantially influenced the grand jury. 2 Initially, the district court had attempted to use its supervisory power to dismiss the indictment because of violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the combined effect of various instances of prosecutorial misconduct. 3 However, the Supreme Court held that "a federal court may not invoke supervisory power to circumvent the harmless error inquiry prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)." 4 The harmless error rule, the Court stated, should be invoked 5 in cases where the error did not "substantially influence" the grand jury's decision. 6 Therefore, where the grand jury has not been substantially influenced by the error, the error is harmless and a court may not invoke its supervisory power to dismiss the indictment. The effect of this ruling is to subordinate the supervisory doctrine to the harmless error rule in federal grand jury cases involving nonconstitutional error. This Note argues that the Court's subordination of the supervisory power doctrine to the harmless error rule eliminates dismissal of indictment as a supervisory power thereby reducing a court's con-trol over its own proceedings. The decision suggests that defendants can no longer expect grand jury proceedings free from even intentional prosecutorial error. The Court reduces Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 67 to a guideline for grand jury proceedings and strips it of its effect as law. 8 Furthermore, this Note argues that criminal defendants will now have an added burden to discover and substantiate allegations of prejudicial error where, prior to Bank of Nova Scotia, errors involving rule violations were presumed cause for dismissal. 9 The Court broadens the scope of the harmless error doctrine beyond its legislative intent.
Therefore, this Note concludes that in attempting to use the harmless error rule to reduce the cost of repeating the grand jury proceedings for trivial errors, the Court has sacrificed judicial integrity and added undue burden on defendants. Supervisory power should be a check on judicial proceedings to make certain that all equities are in balance. Bank of Nova Scotia gives an unjust priority to the harmless error analysis thereby effectively barring a court's authority to supervise grand jury proceedings.
II. BACKGROUND

A.
SUPERVISORY POWER
In addition to testing constitutional validity,' 0 the Supreme Court is obligated to "Uj]udicial [ly] supervis [e] ... the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts [which] implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure." " I Through its supervision, the Court seeks to remedy violations of rights, maintain judicial integrity, and deter illegal conduct.' 2 At-tempting to define supervisory power, one commentator suggests that the Court uses supervisory powers in three situations: (1) cases in which the Court is overseeing the quality of the judicial process; (2) cases in which the Court is addressing the violation of a statute; and, (3) cases in which the Court is trying to remedy conduct which does not violate constitutional or statutory provisions, but is considered judicially inappropriate. 1 3 It must be remembered that supervisory power is not easily definable and that the principles surrounding the judicial supervisory authority are constantly developing. 14 Supervisory power was first recognized by the Court in McNabb v. United States. 15 The McNabbs had been arrested for allegedly murdering a police officer. The officer had investigated the McNabbs for selling whiskey without paying federal taxes. 1 6 A federal officer was assigned to investigate the policeman's murder. However, during the course of his investigation, the federal officer violated several rules of criminal procedure. One of those violations was failing to take the accused persons before a commissioner. 17 The Court did not review the constitutional issue of illegally detaining suspects, but rather focused on the need for a court to supervise the conduct of investigating officers. 1 8 Ordering reversal, the Court concluded that repeated violations of criminal procedure called for supervisory intervention. 19 Most of the Court's post-McNabb development of the supervisory power doctrine has been in the review of basic procedural and evidentiary rules for federal criminal proceedings. 20 Supervisory power has been asserted in cases ensuring fair juries by mandating that jurors be chosen from throughout the community 2 l and calling for a new trial when jurors have access to pretrial publicity. 2 2 In most of these cases, the Court sought to ensure fairness in the judicial process. 23 There is little legislation regarding supervisory power. Aside from statutes permitting courts to establish general rules of conduct for court administration, 24 Congress has acted only twice in response to Court rulings regarding supervisory authority. In response to the Supreme Court ' Unlike the Supreme Court's creation of supervisory power in McNabb, lower federal courts' source of supervisory power has not been identified. 29 Since the Supreme Court's endorsement of the 21 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial discrimination is no basis to exclude a person from grand jury duty).
22 See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (new trial required because jurors read newspaper articles alleging defendant charged with illegal dispensing of drugs had committed two felonies). There is a wide array of cases in which the Court has used supervisory powers. Some decisions are made solely by use of the power, while others combine supervision with some constitutional question. For a more comprehensive discussion of the cases involving the Court's use of supervisory power, see generally Beale, supra note 15; Hill, supra note 13; Judicially Required Rulemaking, supra note 15; Supervisoy Power, supra note 15.
23 Beale, supra note 15, at 1450. Also, as far as the creation of procedures, the Court stated in McNabb that the Court must be "guided by considerations ofjustice not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance." McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341. Thus, as early as the McNabb decision, the overriding consideration in the use of supervisory power has been justice.
24 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982); FED. R. App. P. 47; FED. R. Civ. P. 83; FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a). These rules provide for the creation of court procedures but do not discuss the court's use of supervisory power as a method of dismissal.
25 353 U.S. 657 (1957)(government must disclose memoranda prepared by witnesses against the defendant).
26 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1985) . Primarily, the Act limits the types of memoranda disclosure required of the government. Also, directly influencing appeals of grand jury indictments, the Act states that memoranda disclosure is forbidden until the witness has testified on direct examination at trial. 27 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1985) . 28 Essentially, the Act declares that delay in presenting the accused before a judicial officer only influences whether the defendant's confession was voluntary, not automatically assumes that it was. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1985) . Recall in McNabb that one reversible error was the federal investigating officer's failure to present the defendants to a Commissioner. This Act provides that such an error is only a contributing factor in the decision to reverse.
29 The first instance of lower federal court supervisory power was in Helwig v. United States, 162 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1947), where the court of appeals ordered a new trial so that the defendant could admit evidence even though he knew of its existence before the lower courts' supervisory authority, 30 the exercise of supervision has been diverse. 3 Courts have delicately applied supervisory power to grand jury proceedings because such involvement may impinge upon the grand jury's independence. 4 Although the Constitution calls for independent grand juries, the Court has not clearly defined the parameters of this independence. 35 When using supervisory power, lower courts may not ignore Supreme Court constraints on constitutional remedies. 3 6 To permit otherwise, the Court has concluded, would extend judicial power beyond the limits set by the Constitution. 3 7 However, lower courts may set procedures which are not constitutionally stipulated. 38 Supervisory power, in effect, can be a stopgap where the Court has not identified procedural standards .
9
B. THE HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE
At the turn of the 20th-century, appellate courts often reversed district court decisions that were based on what amounted to trivial errors. 40 Appellate courts were hesitant about declaring errors harmless because the "harmless error" doctrine seemed to infringe upon the jury's duty to weigh evidence. 4 ' Lawyers used this strict Although this list is not exhaustive, it provides an insight into the amount of supervision courts apply. For a more detailed examination of this area, see Beale, supra note 15, at 1458-59. 34 In ascertaining the need for trial, grand juries are not assigned to any particular branch of the government. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: -[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury." Addressing the proposition that supervisory power may bejudicial encroachment on grand jury independence, the Court stated that the grand jury "must be free to pursue its investigation unhindered by external influence or supervi- On the federal level, reform first took shape in several harmless error statutes. 4 4 The purposes of these statutes were to end costly retrials and legitimize the appellate procedure by ridding court dockets of cases founded on trivial error. 45 These statutes broadly defined harmless error as any error which did not "affect the substantial rights of the parties." 4 6 But, difficulties arose in defining substantial rights and in distinguishing substantial from technical rights. 4 7 Consequently, the factors defining substantial rights were narrowed to include only the nature of the proceedings at issue, the stake in the outcome, and the amount of influence the error had on the judgment. 48 The last factor was given increasingly greater weight in defining harmless error until courts eventually agreed that " [t] Comparing the harmless error doctrine to the level of assurance can be confusing. It might be easier to think of the assurance level as a spectrum: on one end no certainty, followed by reasonably certain, then highly probable, to certain beyond a reasonable doubt, and, on the opposite end, certainty. See generally R. TRAYNOR, supra note 40. In determining the error's effect on the jury, the extreme ends of the spectrum are, for the most part, not considered (as human beings, we can speculate to some degree how other human beings would be affected by evidence or testimony, but that same human characteristic will not allow us to be ever completely certain of how another would react). Therefore, a judge is left with applying one of the middle standards. When applying the harmless error doctrine to the highly probable test, it means that in order for a conviction to be affirmed, the reviewing judge has to be highly certain that the error was harmless. When the assurance test is only reasonable, then the judge just has to be reasonably certain that the error was harmless. Therefore, the less certain ajudge has to be before granting dismissal of a conviction or indictment, the easier it is to apply the harmless error rule. rights, 5 1 the Court decided that the reviewing judge had to be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the jury's decision. 5 2 However, in federal cases involving nonconstitutional issues, the level of assurance had not been established in all case types. 53 Procedural errors, such as discrimination in the jury selection process, 54 were almost always reversed. Assurance level of harmful error ran high in cases involving such influences as trial domination by hostile observers 55 or pretrial publicity. 5 6 The standard of assurance in other types of procedural error, such as willful violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and prosecutorial misconduct, was less clear.
United States v. Mechanik 57 is the most recent case involving federal nonconstitutional error. A federal grand jury in that case indicted the defendants on drug-related offenses and conspiracy. 
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Use of harmless error doctrine in cases involving constitutional rights was first debated in Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 87 (1963) (defendant was convicted of willfully despoiling a public building by painting swastikas on a synagogue). Evidence admitted at trial in that case was illegally seized in violation of the fourth amendment right against illegal searches and seizures. Id. The Court questioned "whether there was a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Id. at 85-87 (emphasis added). The Court held that the possibility was indeed more than reasonable that the jury was affected by the evidence and reversed the conviction. Id. at 92. The "reasonable possibility" test was altered in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 19 (1967)(prosecutor, in violation of the fifth amendment right against selfincrimination, commented on the defendant's failure to testify and the judge instructed the jury that they could draw inferences from the defendant's silence). In reversing the conviction, the Court held that to use the harmless error doctrine, the reviewing court must be certain "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the error did not affect the jury's decision. Id. at 24. See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983)(prosecutor's comment on defense's evidence and defendant's silence in closing arguments is violation of fifth amendment). During the grand jury process, two law enforcement officers testified in tandem. 59 The defendants appealed the indictment on the basis that the in tandem testimony violated Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 6 0 Before the appeal was heard, however, the defendants were found guilty at the trial. 6 ' The Court held that because the petit jury found the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the appeal of the indictment was moot. 62 However, the Court did not say that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" test would necessarily apply in all cases involving federal nonconstitutional error.
C. SUPERVISORY POWER MEETS HARMLESS ERROR
Many cases involve aspects of both supervisory power and harmless error but few courts have wrestled directly with the convergence of the two doctrines. 63 The standard for supervisory power use when a statute is involved was established in Thomas v. Arn6 4 in which the Court said "[e]ven a sensible and efficient use of the supervisory power ... is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions." 65 In United States v. Payner, 6 6 the Court said that to permit supervisory power to invalidate statutes would "confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered 59 Id. 60 Id. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) provides: "Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters.... and ... a stenographer... may be present while the grand jury is in session." Note that "witness" is singular.
61 Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 67.
Id.
63 At times it is difficult to determine whether a court is addressing the conflict between harmless error and supervisory power or only one of those topics. For instance, in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) , where the defendant's conviction was overruled because women were not permitted to serve on the grand jury, it is difficult to determine whether reversal was based on harmless error, whether the court wanted to exercise supervisory power to ensure a fair trial, or both, thereby establishing that where there is a "harmful" error, supervisory power is appropriate. The Court did not expressly state its holding in terms of a clash between supervisory power and harmless error. Another example is United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980)(conviction of defendant for falsifying federal income tax return affirmed even though government illegally searched third party's briefcase for evidence against defendant). The Court discussed harmless error and supervisory power in a roundabout way. It concluded that the exclusion of necessary but illegally seized evidence "exacts a costly toll" upon a court's ability to discover the truth. Id. at 734. The Court might be claiming that the cost of retrial has to be weighed against the magnitude of the error-but this is not clear. Similar cases will not be explored in this section in order to avoid confusion. Rather, discussion is limited to those situations in which the Court expressly debated use of supervisory power in place of harmless error. limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing. 6 7 The peculiar nature of the conflict between harmless error and supervisory power is furthered by the dilemma that harmless error statutes do not offer specific boundaries for their application. Rather, they apply when even something less than substantial rights have been abridged. 6 8 Courts have struggled to determine when supervisory power may be used, at what point harmless error analysis takes over, and whether the two are unrelated.
The Supreme Court first addressed this convergence in United
States v. Hale. 69 In Hale, the defendant was arrested for robbery and while at the police station asserted his right to remain silent. 70 At trial, however, the prosecutor attempted to impeach the defendant's testimony by suggesting his silence was somehow incriminating. 7 ' The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision to employ supervisory power to reverse the conviction because the defendant's assertion of his right to remain silent had no probative value and the prosecutor's questioning had "a significant potential for prejudice." ' 72 In terms of harmless error analysis, this decision suggests that supervisory power is appropriate where there exists a significant possibility that the error or conduct affected substantial rights. The prevailing decision in the convergence of the harmless error and supervisory doctrines involving constitutional harmless error was United States v. Hasting. 7 3 Respondents were charged, tried, and convicted in Hasting for kidnapping and transporting women across state lines for immoral purposes, and for conspiring to commit such offenses. 7 4 The respondents did not testify during the trial. 75 During summation, and over defense counsel's objection, the prosecution made references to the respondents' silence. 76 As in Hale, the court of appeals used its supervisory power to reverse the conviction because the summation violated the respondents' fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 77 The court did not rely on harmless error because use of that doctrine " 'would impermissibly compromise the clear constitutional violation of the defendants' Fifth Amendment rights.'"78 The Supreme Court upheld the district court and stated that even constitutional violations are subject to harmless error. 7 9 The Court concluded that the use of "[s]upervisory power to reverse a conviction is not needed as a remedy when the error to which it is addressed is harmless since, by definition, the conviction would have been obtained notwithstanding the asserted error." 80 The lower courts disagree in the application of supervisory power when there are nonconstitutional errors in the trial process. 88 It can be argued that the court of appeals used supervisory power to reverse the conviction because of the Rule 6 violation and that the Supreme Court upheld the conviction because the error was harmless.
versing the conviction because the prosecutor violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 and not because the court believed it was necessary to invoke supervisory power. 8 9 But by dismissing the indictment, the appellate court signalled to trial courts that supervisory power is a means of dismissing statutory violations.90 Furthermore, Mechanik cannot be classified as a true supervisory case because the Supreme Court did not weigh the error on the minds of the grand jurors to determine if the error affected their decision. 9 1 Rather, the Court assumed the error was not prejudicial because the petit jury convicted the defendants. As of the initiation of the grand jury proceedings against the defendants in Bank of Nova Scotia, the Supreme Court had not determined whether a district court might use supervisory power to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct and rule violations committed during the grand jury investigation where the errors did not prejudice the defendants. The procedural differences between trials and grand jury proceedings may call for different views of supervisory authority in cases involving harmless error.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1982, eight defendants were indicted by two successive grand juries 93 on 26 counts of conspiracy to defraud. Some of the defendants were also indicted with mail and tax fraud. 94 The final 89 Id. at 69.
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Id. The court of appeals was not using supervisory power to determine whether a rule was violated-that was a conclusion of fact. Rather, the court dismissed the indictment and conviction because there was no other prescribed avenue of sanction. count charged one defendant with obstruction of justice. 95 The district court dismissed the first 26 counts on the grounds that the indictment failed to charge a crime and was improperly pleaded. 96 The court also dismissed the charges against the Bank of Nova Scotia because the indictment failed to allege the Bank's or its representatives' requisite knowledge or intent to commit the crimes charged.
9 7 The government appealed all the dismissals.
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Prior to oral argument, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit partially remanded the case to determine if grounds for dismissal should also have included prosecutorial misconduct and irregularities in the grand jury proceedings. 9 9 Before and immediately after the partial remand, the district court granted defendant Kilpatrick a new trial on the obstruction of justice count, and ordered the government to disclose transcripts of the grand jury proceedings. 0 0
After ten days of post-trial hearings, the district court dismissed all 27 counts. 10 (2) causing the same IRS agents to summarize falsely evidence against the Bank and by permitting joint appearances by IRS agents before the grand jury in violation of Rule 6(d);
(3) disclosing grand jury materials to IRS agents involved in civil tax enforcement, failing to notify promptly the court of this disclosure, disclosing the names of persons targeted for grand jury investigation to possible witnesses, and imposing unauthorized conduct prevented the grand jury from acting independently of the prosecution. 0 4 Furthermore, the court dismissed on the basis of its supervisory power and stated that "the supervisory authority of the court must be used in circumstances such as those presented in this case to declare with unmistakable intention that such conduct is neither 'silly' nor 'frivolous' and that it will not be tolerated."' 0 5
A divided panel of the appellate court then reinstated the indictment.
0 6 The court held that violations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6 are not per se grounds for dismissal. 10 7 It also held that dismissal could not be based on the totality of circumstances because the misconduct did not interfere with the grand jury's ability to act independently.' 0 8 The court concluded that "the drastic remedy of dismissal of an indictment, whether premised on due process or supervisory powers theories, cannot be exercised without significant infringement on the grand jury's ability to exercise independent judgment." 1 0 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the tenth circuit decision to determine the use of supervisory power in light of the harmless error rule. More specifically, the Court framed the issue as "whether a District Court may invoke its supervisory power to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct in a grand jury investigation, where the misconduct does not prejudice the defendants." Although some of the prosecutorial conduct could not on its own be the basis for dismissal, the district court held that the totality of the misconduct called for dismissal. The government's misconduct included:
(1) violations of the Witness Immunity Statutes (18 U.S.C. § § 6002, 6003) by granting pocket immunity to 23 witnesses;
(2) violations of the fifth amendment by calling seven witnesses who the government knew would invoke their privilege against self-incrimination; (3) violations of the sixth amendment by interrogating high level bank employees after the indictment; (4) knowing and deliberate presentation of misinformation to the grand jury; IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY
Writing for the majority," 1 ' Justice Kennedy held that "as a general matter, a District Court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants."'1" 2 Justice Kennedy noted that a federal court has the authority to exercise supervisory power"1 3 and stated such power cannot conflict with constitutional requirements or federal statutory prescriptions. 1 4 Nor can, said the Court, the harmless error rule" 1 5 be disregarded." t 6 A difficult question arises, Justice Kennedy stated, when the dismissal of a grand jury indictment conflicts with the harmless error inquiry required by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." t7 The tension results from the use of supervisory power to address procedural violations that are harmless." l 8 Embedded in that tension is the task of defining a harmless error." 9 When dismissal of the indictment is sought for nonconstitutional errors, Justice Kennedy concluded that an error is harmful and thereby dismissible "only 'if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict, ' ceptions to the harmless error rule. 123 The grand jury's structural protections 124 in these cases are violated so that the proceedings are presumed prejudiced 125 and application of harmless error would require unguided speculation.
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Citing Mechanik 127 and Hasting,' 28 Justice Kennedy stated that the harmless error test is applicable when a court must determine the validity of an indictment before the conclusion of the trial and the prosecutorial misconduct is not prejudicial to the defendant. 12 9 In applying the harmless error test, Justice Kennedy warned that "a federal court may not invoke supervisory power to circumvent the harmless error inquiry prescribed by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 52(a).' 3 0
The majority then assessed whether there was grave doubt that the grand jury was substantially influenced by the prosecutors' violations and misconduct in this case.' 3 1 Justice Kennedy focused on five findings of the district court that had the possibility of throwing 130 Id. Contrary to the appellate court,Justice Kennedy did not equatejudicial assessment of the violations' influences on the grand jury with infringement on the grand jury's independence. Id. Such infringements may, but not necessarily will, he said, substantially influence the grand jury's decision to indict. Id. Justice Kennedy added that the Court did not grant certiorari to decide the issue of grand jury independence. Id. Presumably, the grand jury's independence means its ability to conduct the grand jury proceedings and reach a decision without undue influence by either the government or the defense. The grand jury should not act as an arm of the government. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 17 (1973) .
131 Justice Kennedy readily dismissed the following violations' influences on the grand jury:
(1) violation of the sixth amendment by conducting investigations on bank employees occurred after the indictment and, therefore, could not have influenced the decision to indict;
(2) violation of the fifth amendment by calling seven witnesses who were predicted to invoke their privilege against self-incrimination was not error because the government was not required to depend on unsworn assertions by these witnesses and the
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[Vol. 79 grave doubt on the grand jury's charge. 1 32 First, the Court concluded that the jurors were adequately advised that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents sworn as "agents" of the grand jury were aligned with the prosecutors. 3 3 Second, in regard to the IRS agents' false summaries, the majority decided that the Government did not cause the agents to testify falsely and that the unreliable evidence was not enough reason to dismiss the indictment. 3 4 Third, Justice Kennedy found nothing to indicate that the prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jurors substantially affected the charging decision. 3 5 Fourth, as to the Government's grant of pocket immunity 36 to 23 witnesses, Justice Kennedy concluded that the grand jury was not substantially influenced. 13 7 Finally, the majority government repeatedly requested the grand jury not to draw any conclusions from a witness's use of the fifth amendment; (3) manipulation of the grand jury investigation to gather evidence for civil tax investigations could not affect the decision to indict; (4) violation of rule 6(e) by revealing targets of grand jury investigation to potential witnesses could not affect the charging decision;
(5) violation of rule 6(e) by imposing secrecy violations on grand jury witnesses could not alter the decision to indict. Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2375-76. The majority did not give specific reasons why the last three violations could not affect the charging decision. 132 Id. 133 Id. at 2376-77. Justice Kennedy supported this conclusion by citing prosecutorial references to the IRS agents as "my agent(s)" and grand jury references to the agents as "your guys" or "your agents." Id. at 2377. 134 Id. Justice Kennedy emphasized that an indictment valid on its face cannot be challenged on the reliability or competency of the evidence presented. 135 Id. Justice Kennedy noted that the prosecutor requested the grand jury to disregard the conversations. These ameliorative measures were sufficient to alleviate grave doubt that the grand jury was substantially influenced by the remarks. Id.
136 Pocket immunity is "putative immunity granted to a witness by letter or oral representation of the prosecutor rather than ordered by a judge after satisfaction of the procedures of 18 U.S.C. § § 6002 and 6003." United States v. Anderson, 577 F. Supp. 223, 233 (1983) .
137 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2377. Justice Kennedy pointed out that the jurors were aware that these witnesses made a deal with the Government thereby alleviating the substantial influence of the pocket immunity. Id. Also, the Court said that a substantial effect on the charging decision could not be construed by the fact that some prosecutors told the grand jury that the immunized witnesses could invoke a fifth amendment privilege while other prosecutors stated the witnesses had no such privilege. Id. Justice Kennedy noted that if the Government threatened to revoke immunity, prejudice might be established. Although one witness believed that the prosecutor's statement that if he "'testified for Mr. Kilpatrick, all bets were off' "was a threat to withdraw immunity if he did not conform his testimony, the Court found this was not enough to warrant dismissal. InsteadJustice Kennedy claimed that, at most, the reliability of his testimony would be questionable. Id. at 2377-78 (quoting United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1338 (1984) ).
acknowledged that permitting two IRS agents to read transcripts in tandem was in violation of Rule 6(d). 138 Such a violation did not, however, prejudice the grand jury. 3 9 Justice Kennedy further noted that the alleged misconduct occurred over the course of a 20-month investigation with many witnesses and documents. 140 In the totality of such an involved investigation, the Court concluded that the "violations that did occur do not, even when considered cumulatively, raise a substantial question, much less a grave doubt, as to whether they had a substantial effect on the grand jury's decision to charge."141 Justice Kennedy stated that alternatives to dismissal included contempt of court, 14 2 directing the prosecutor to show why he should not be disciplined,1 43 and reprimanding the prosecutor in a published opinion. 14 4 The Court said that these alternatives would reprimand the prosecutor but not "grant ... a windfall to the unprejudiced defendant [s] ." 145 The Court concluded that a district court could dismiss an indictment upon finding that the defendants were prejudiced by the prosecutorial misconduct. The district court must determine whether the errors impacted the grand jury's decision to indict. "If violations did substantially influence [the] decision [to indict], or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from such substantial influence, the violations cannot be deemed harmless." 1 4 6 The Court held that the errors in this case did not pass this standard and affirmed the indictment. olation of the law. 14 9 Justice Scalia further acknowledged that the Supreme Court may review lower courts' use of supervisory power although he did not see any direct authority for the Court to supervise lower courts. 1 5 0 Justice Scalia stated that lower courts might use their supervisory powers to regulate a prosecutor's performance before the court and to establish that a prosecutor is a member of the court's bar. 15 ' Justice Scalia then merely said, "I join the opinion of the Court because I understand the supervisory power at issue here to be of the first sort."' 152
C. THE DISSENT
In the dissent, Justice Marshall argued by reference to his earlier dissent in Mechanik,1 5 3 where he asserted that the "goal of upholding criminal convictions not marred by substantial defect does not justify reducing Congress' command regarding the proper conduct of grand jury proceedings to a mere form of words, without practical effect." 154 Unfortunately, he said, the secrecy of the grand jury process makes prosecutorial misconduct difficult to prove.' 5 5
In light of this procedural advantage for the prosecution, Justice Marshall stated that Rule 6 had "little enough bite."' 56 He then assailed the majority for leaving the rule "toothless" by subordinating it to the harmless error rule.' 57 Moreover, Justice Marshall claimed that this could not have been Congress' intent.
155 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2379 (Marshall, J. dissenting). Defendants, he said, regularly must rely on theJencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, which allows for disclosure of grand jury transcripts only after trial is underway, making dismissal difficult for defendants to procure in the first place. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) . Furthermore, the information disclosed may be incomplete. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2379 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 157 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158 Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 82-83 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall outlined the legislative history of Rule 6 and how the harmless error doctrine was intended to affect Rule 6 errors in Mechanik. Due to the presence of stenographers at grand jury proceedings, Congress enacted a harmless error rule to offset dismissals due to Rule 6 violations. Act of 1946, § 1025 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 556 (1985) . However, Congress never disagreed with the general idea that the presence of unauthorized per-Justice Marshall then noted that affirming criminal convictions not marred by substantial error in the grand jury process reduces to formality Congress' intent as to proper conduct in grand jury proceedings. 5 9 Respect for the law and legislative intent, Justice Marshall claimed, require dismissal of indictments issued for rule violations so that " 'the ardor of prosecuting officials be kept within legal bounds and justice be secured.' "160 Deterrence of Rule 6 violations could be achieved only by a per se rule of dismissal. 16 1 Justice Marshall also asserted that the prejudicial impact created by Rule 6 violations would be impossible to evaluate accurately. 16 2 Reviewing cases for alleged prejudice places an administrative burden on courts and will not offer defendants meaningful protection. 16 3 Justice Marshall concluded that subjecting Rule 6 to harmless error analysis reduces that rule to "little more than a code of honor that prosecutors can violate with impunity."1 64 V. ANALYSIS Supervisory power and the harmless error doctrine should be applied in conjunction to ensure the defendant of a fair trial and to uphold the integrity of the judicial system. In Bank of Nova Scotia, however, the Supreme Court did not establish a technique by which both judicial tools work together to achieve these goals. Instead, the Court subordinated the use of supervisory authority to the harmless error rule thereby narrowing the scope of a fair trial and devaluing the integrity of the judicial system. Rather than using the tools of supervisory authority and harmless error to improve the judicial process, the Court in Bank of Nova Scotia misapplied them thereby misshaping their definitions and misdirecting their purposes.
Originally, harmless error doctrine was adopted to prevent defendants from receiving unfair advantages.1 65 One argument rightly posed in favor of the harmless error doctrine is the high cost of retrial.' 6 6 The harmless error rule is appropriate where excessive observance of formality turns courtrooms into technical battlegrounds. The Supreme Court, however, has now expanded this initial intent of the doctrine so that all alleged errors are reviewed in light of potential, prejudice suffered by the defendant.
7
The supervisory power doctrine has been used to ensure fairness to the defendant and the judicial system where sanctions are not prescribed or where the error is not specifically addressed in a statute. 68 Judges use the power to manage court business by ensuring that conduct follows statutory guidelines.1 69 The judge can therefore use supervision as a means of ensuring the fairest outcome possible.
It seems odd that these two tools striving for equity should clash. Yet the differing methods of attaining that goal can conflict. In United States v. Kilpatrick,1 70 the district court used its supervisory power to correct the prosecutor's violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and his misconduct. 17 The appellate court applied the harmless error rule to hold these violations benign.
72
The Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision 7 3 and subordinated supervisory authority to a new narrow definition of harmless error. Now, errors are harmful and dismissible only where they substantially prejudice the defendant.
174
The Court did not note that the supervisory doctrine, however, has a much larger scope of dismissible errors. That doctrine includes not only the prejudicial impact suffered by the defendant, but also the prejudicial impact on the integrity of the judicial system. 175 In reality, these two types of prejudicial errors must be related: errors prejudicing the defendant also negatively affect the integrity of Now, only where the grand jury's decision to indict has been substantially influenced by error can there be dismissal of the indictment based on the harmless error rule.' 8 0 Substantial prejudicial influence means an error harmful enough to dismiss.' 8 ' Therefore, only harmful errors can result in dismissal. Other errors are harmless and no other means of intervention, including supervisory power, can achieve dismissal.
Bank of Nova Scotia also has due process 8 2 implications. A defendant cannot expect a trial free of all error, 8 3 but now a defend- Both the harmless-error rule and the exercise of supervisory powers advance the important judicial and public interest in the orderly and efficient administration of justice. Exercise of the supervisory powers also can further the strong public interest in the integrity of the judicial process .... Admittedly, using the supervisory powers to reverse a conviction under these circumstances appears to conflict with the public's interest in upholding otherwise valid convictions that are tainted only by harmless error. But it is certainly arguable that the public's interests in preserving judicial integrity and in insuring that Government prosecutors, as its agents, refrain from intentionally violating defendants' rights are stronger than its interest in upholding the conviction of a particular criminal defendant. Convictions are important, but they should not be protected at any cost. Id. 179 In Hasting, Justice Brennan noted that the Court's decision to use the harmless error doctrine to affirm a conviction "could be read to establish a per se rule against use of the supervisory powers to reverse a conviction based on harmless error." Hasting, 461 U.S. at 523, (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, however, did not believe that the Court had either addressed or decided this point. Id. at 500 (Brennan, J. dissenting). Bank of Nova Scotia, however, closes the door on the use of supervisory power where there is harmless error because only substantially prejudicial errors (harmful errors) result in dismissal. Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2378. 180 Id. 181 Id. Because the Court determined that the district court could not dismiss absent a finding of prejudice that substantially influenced the jury, it follows that substantial prejudice is the new definition of a harmful error.
182 U.S. CONST ant cannot expect a trial free of even flagrant procedural error or intentional prosecutorial misconduct. Essentially, due process in grand jury proceedings currently means an indictment free from prejudicial error regardless of statutory violations or prosecutorial misconduct during the proceedings.
Bank of Nova Scotia also strips Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 6 of its statutory rank, reducing it to a suggested guideline for grand jury proceedings. 1 8 4 Given Bank of Nova Scotia, the only enforceable statute is Rule 52 whereby all errors-statutory or otherwise-are reviewed for their prejudicial impact. If a Rule 6 error is not prejudicial then Rule 6 is suspended; if a Rule 6 error is prejudicial then Rule 6 is enforced. The need, then, for Rule 6 has been effectively eliminated.
All alleged errors, including those defined by Rule 6, can be subjected to the Rule 52 harmless error test. The effect of this broad application leads to the absurd result that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to grand jury proceedings are reduced to the harmless error test.' 8 5 This could not have been the legislature's intent.
Additionally, the Court's misapplication of the harmless error rule is not supported by legislative history. The committee note corresponding to Rule 52(a) states that the rule was a restatement of 28 U.S.C. § 391186 and 18 U.S.C. § 556.187 The language of these two rules strongly suggests that the harmless error doctrine was originally meant to affirm decisions where the error was superficial. l8 8 The Court has severely narrowed the meaning of "substan- 188 "Technical errors, defects, or exceptions", 28 U.S.C. § 391, and "any defect or imperfection in matter of form only", 18 U.S.C. § 556, suggest that legislative intent was focused on technical or superficial errors.
rights" to include the grand jury guidelines set forth in the criminal code or it would not have gone to such lengths to promulgate procedural rules ensuring the integrity of grandjury proceedings. This is not to imply that all rules promulgated by Congress are accorded substantial rights status. But, where extensive rules are set forth to ensure that the accused is guaranteed certain procedural guidelines assuring the accused a fair hearing or trial, there is a strong presumption that those guidelines are themselves substantial rights. According to 28 U.S.C. § 391 and 18 U.S.C. § 556, where substantial rights are involved, only technical errors or errors of form can be viewed as harmless. The Court does not view the grand jury procedures or prosecutorial conduct as substantial rights outside the scope of the harmless error doctrine. The Court has thus narrowed the meaning of substantial rights and enlarged the opportunity for using harmless error far beyond the intent of the legislature.
Bank of Nova Scotia places an enormous burden on a defendant to prove that the grand jury was prejudicially affected by error. 190 Yet, grand jury proceedings by their very nature are difficult for defendants to appeal.1 9 1 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are 189 The two statutes state that where substantial rights of the parties are involved, technical errors will not cause dismissal of a conviction or indictment. This suggests that technical errors of rights which are less than substantial may lead to dismissal. Certainly the legislature sought to avoid dismissal for technical defects in all cases. However, the latter interpretation of the statute may lead to the notion that where less than substantial rights are involved, the error does not have to be as egregious as in cases involving substantial rights in order to result in dismissal. Therefore, the more a right is substantial, the more egregious the error must be before the error will result in dismis- guideposts leading to an equitably issued indictment. Now that Bank of Nova Scotia has essentially removed those guideposts, the defense has an even more difficult task of detecting and proving prejudicial errors. Instead of a clear statutory basis for dismissal, the defense is now at the mercy of judicial speculation over the magnitude of the error. Supervisory power ought to be employed in cases like Bank of Nova Scotia where procedural guidelines are violated and prosecutorial misconduct has occurred. In a narrow application of the cost/benefit analysis, 19 2 the cost of dismissal would be another grand jury proceeding which might only result in reindictment. However, the greater implications made in this analysis predict a greater cost to the integrity of the judicial process that must eventually limit the rights of the defendant in a grand jury proceeding.
The effect of this decision is to make dismissal of federal grand jury indictments more difficult and increasingly unlikely. The Court has swung the harmless error pendulum from the need to remove decisions for the defense based on excessive formalities to the opposite end where the defense has the burden of effectively alleging prejudicial impact on the mental process of grand jury members. The Court misapplied the tools of supervisory power and harmless error so that the goals of judicial integrity and fair grand jury proceedings are still unmet.
Furthermore, courts are now far less able to correct the attacks on the integrity of the judicial system resulting from rule violations and prosecutorial misconduct. If a court cannot control the behavior and procedures before it, no other avenue remains to protect the judicial system. This dilemma is even more alarming in the grand jury stage than at the trial stage because during the former, the accused has few methods of ensuring a fair grand jury proceeding and must rely on the court to uphold the procedural guidelines when violations have occurred. In other words, during a grand jury proceeding, the defense has no process available to correct or contradict violations as it has at trial.
Flagrant and repeated prosecutorial misconduct and procedural violations during a grand jury proceeding are substantial violations that result in harmful errors that cannot be categorized as technical errors and defects. Dismissal is an extraordinary means of correcting errors. 9 3 But, if the harmless error pendulum is to 192 Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. 193 The Court suggested that attorneys who commit errors like those in Bank of Nova Scotia be disciplined by other means such as contempt charges. Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2378. But there might be reasons why a reviewing court would reject the use of swing to a more middle ground, between use of the harmless error doctrine to prevent technical errors from resulting in dismissal of an indictment and the over-use of the harmless error rule in all but a very few cases involving a narrow definition of substantial rights, dismissal should be used more often in cases wherejudicial integrity and the defendant's right to a grand jury proceeding free from flagrant rule violations are abridged.
Also, in the vein of squeezing out equity in the Bank of Nova Scotia decision, the standard of harmless error review should be more clearly defined so as to accommodate the need to make at least a deferential nod in the direction ofjudicial integrity and adherence to procedural rules. The Court stated that where there is "grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from such substantial influence, the violations cannot be deemed harmless."' 9 4 The review standard ought to be that where the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, not left to just the obscure standard of a "grave doubt," the reviewing court should affirm the indictment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Supervisory power and the harmless error doctrine can and ought to work in conjunction to maintain and perhaps to improve the quality and integrity of federal grand jury proceedings. It is a mistake to permit one doctrine to overshadow the other. Bank of Nova Scotia elevates the harmless error doctrine above supervisory power even though such a decision contravenes legislative intent, places added burden on the defendants, and ignores due process concerns. Where the harmless error rule should act as a check on certain types of errors, supervisory power should catch those errors which threaten the judicial process. Bank of Nova Scotia, however, broadens the use of harmless error by limiting the definition of a substantial right and precluding supervisory power from acting as a secondary check guarding the judicial process. The result is a dangerous imbalance of equities in grand jury proceedings.
However, the Bank of Nova Scotia decision can be rendered more palatable if the standard for harmless error review is strict. Any ermethods other than dismissal. United States v. Hasting, 61 U.S. 499, 522 (1983) . One such reason is the "futility of relying on Department of Justice disciplinary proceedings." Id. It should also be restated that the prosecutor's actions and violations have affected more than just that particular proceeding. Also at stake are the integrity of the judicial process and eventual impact on the grand jury process. Taken in that context, dismissal may be the only appropriate method of discipline. 194 Bank of Nova Scotia, 108 S. Ct. at 2378.
ror may be deemed harmless only if the court is certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the grand jury was not prejudiced. This solution is temporary. A complete review of the use of harmless error and supervisory power is necessary to achieve a balance between judicial efficiency and judicial integrity. In Bank of Nova Scotia, the Court subordinated the tool of supervisory power to the harmless error rule. As a result, judicial integrity was sacrificed for a narrow view of reversible error. The goals of fair grand jury proceedings and judicial integrity are still unmet.
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